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Abstract:  
The agreement recently signed between Morocco and the United States foresees several modalities in dismantling 
tariffs. Our simulations show that the various modalities of trade liberalization may have different impacts on the 
welfare, the rate of growth and the sectoral trade balance of these two countries. More precisely, our findings justify 
the interest of a gradual and asymmetrical agreement. In addition, the FTA between the US and Morocco will have a 
significant impact not only on trade between the two countries, but also on their trading relationships with other 
countries. The most important trade diversion will affect the EU and particularly France, which is Morocco’s largest 
trading partner. It will also adversely affect the other North African countries. The FTA will thus offer the 
opportunity to Morocco to diversify its markets and its capabilities, which are currently focused on the EU, 
particularly on France and Spain.   
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1. Introduction 
Free trade agreements (FTA) between Morocco and the US will expose the Moroccan economy 
to increased competition on both price and quality in a range of products. This competitive 
pressure should provoke an increase in productivity on the part of Moroccan firms. Under such 
circumstances, it is quite possible that allowing US exports tariff-free access to the Moroccan 
market could result in substantial trade diversion. Although Moroccan consumers could enjoy 
lower prices, these gains could be more than offset for the economy as a whole because of the 
loss in tariff revenue and the purchase of goods from the United States rather than more efficient 
sources. In addition, there is the possibility that Morocco could experience declines in its terms of 
trade since its tariff reductions would be much larger than those of the United States.  
 
The focus of the empirical analysis will be on the trade liberalization component of the FTA. The 
following are the specific questions to be addressed: 
 
• First, how does Morocco gain or lose based on the impacts on GDP, trade and other 
macroeconomic aggregates from the bilateral trade liberalization between Morocco 
and the US? 
• Second, what sectors lose and what sectors gain? 
• Third, what are the welfare implications for Morocco from the FTA? 
• Fourth, how does the formation of FTA affect trade expansion through the trade 
creation and trade diversion effects? 
• Fifth, what are the fiscal implications of the FTA? 
 
Consequently, this study will also try to quantify the impact of the FTA on direct revenue. The 
quantification of the trade expansion will provide a basis for estimating the resulting revenue 
effects due to trade diversion from non-US to US producers and suppliers. 
 
The agreement recently signed between Morocco and the United States foresees several 
modalities in dismantling tariffs. The problems with dismantling tariffs will be examined in the 
essential cereals, red meats and vegetables sectors where a period of transition is necessary for 
their survival. Indeed, the American agricultural sector is the most efficient in the world, 
especially for cereals. This sector was the main obstacle in the finalization of the FTA. Indeed, 
the Moroccan economy is largely based on the agriculture. Fifty percent of the working 
population are employed in the primary sector, while 70 % of farmers cultivate cereal. American 
products would bean extremely serious threat to Moroccan agriculture, as the US products are of 
very good quality and are produced at cheaper cost in part due to domestic subsidies. During the 
negotiations, the Moroccan party had recommended reserving cereals as a special case before 
total liberalization. However, the position of the US delegation was that an FTA needed to 
include agricultural products.   
 
The benefit of the FTA lies in the structural changes the Moroccan agriculture would undergo to 
make it more competitive and to better exploit the comparative advantages of the country. The 
questions and the answers which are arising from this converge on the same conclusion, as we 
shall demonstrate namely the interest for both partners of an asymmetric agreement and a 
progressive dismantling, especially for Morocco 
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The article is structured as follows: Following the Introduction, Section 2 highlights Morocco’s 
trade relations with US compared to that with European Union (EU). Section 3 presents the 
methodology used to assess the necessity of an asymmetric FTA, while Section 4 describes the 
models used in the analysis. A description of the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) 6 and 
World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) models is made in this section. Section 5 presents the 
main results obtained from the simulations. Lastly, section 6 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Trade performance of Morocco’s economy 
 
Morocco’s major imports and exports are in manufacturing (around 62 % of imports and 65 %of 
exports in value terms in 2001).  Machinery and transport equipment, textiles and chemicals are 
the main imports. Imports of textiles are mainly in connection with sub-contracting, particularly 
with partners in the EU. The rapid increase in their share of total imports of goods was mainly 
due to a change in the way they are entered in the accounts (how they are reflected in trade 
statistics). Agricultural foodstuffs and products from the mining and quarrying industries form 
the primary imported goods.  Variations in imports of fuel primarily reflect the fluctuations in 
their global price. 
The EU is Morocco’s principal trading partner, both for imports and exports (see figures 1 and 2). 
France alone provides over 20 % (24 % in 2000 and 22.5 % in 2001) of total imports.; Other 
major importers to Moroccan include Spain, the United Kingdom, Italy and Germany.  Outside 
the EU, Morocco also imports goods from the United States and Saudi Arabia, while the volume 
of imports from other regions is negligible. 
 
Table 1. Balance of payments, 1995-01 
(US$ millions) 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
      
Balance in the current transactions account -1,296 -58 -169 -146 -171 -501 1,606.0
Trade balance -2,482 -2,193 -1,864 -2,319 -2,448 -3,235 -3,022.0
  Exports f.o.b. 6,871 6,886 7,039 7,144 7,509 7,419 7,142.0
  Imports, f.o.b. -9,353 -9,080 -8,903 -9,463 -9,957 -10,654 -10,164.0
Services balance 283 961 747 864 1,112 1,142 1910
  Credit 2,173 2,743 2,471 2,827 3,115 3,034 4,029.0
  Debit -1,890 -1,782 -1,724 -1,963 -2,003 -1,892 -2,119.0
Revenue balance -1,318 -1,309 -1,176 -1,033 -985 -864 -833.0
Current transfers (net) 2,220 2,483 2,123 2,343 2,150 2,456 3,550.0
      
Capital account balance -6 73 -5 -10 -9 -6 -9.0
      
Financial operations account balance -984 -897 -990 -644 -13 -774 -967.0
Direct investment in Morocco 92 76 4 12 3 221 144.0
Direct investment abroad -15 -30 -9 -20 -18 -59 -97.0
Portfolio investment 20 142 38 24 6 17 -8.0
Other investment -1,083 -1,085 -1,022 -660 -4 -954 -1,006.0
      
Errors and omissions 391 209 175 160 123 114 230.0
      
Overall balance -1,895 -673 -988 -640 -69 -1,167 860
      
Financing 1,895 673 988 640 69 1,167 -860
Reserve assets 984 -274 -553 -248 -1,636 416 -3,842.0
Use of IMF resources -101 -47 -3 0 0 0 0.0
Exceptional financing 1,013 995 1,544 887 1,705 751 2,982.0
      
Gross official reserves      
Foreign exchange reserves in terms of months of 
imports 
4.6 5 5.4 5.2 6.7 5.4 9.9
Source: IMF (2002). 
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France receives over one quarter of Morocco’s exported goods, followed by Spain, the United 
Kingdom, Italy, and Germany.  In terms of share of trade, the order of importance of the leading 
partners is the same, both for imports and exports.  The high concentration of exports to the EU is 
mainly due to the change in the method of reflecting sub-contracting operations in the accounts. 
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3. The Free trade Agreement between Morocco and the US: General Equilibrium 
Analytical Methodology  
This section discusses in detail the methodology applied for the empirical analysis. The 
discussion starts by outlining the GTAP modelling and data framework. The GTAP model 
analysis is complemented in the study with a partial equilibrium analysis model, or SMART 
model, developed jointly by the World Bank and UNCTAD. The SMART methodology is 
therefore also described in this section. The partial equilibrium model is aimed to provide some 
results at the tariff lines level (6-digit level). 
 
3.1. Rationale for a General Equilibrium Methodology 
Trade policy analysis involves examining implications of trade policy instruments on the 
production structure in economies at the national and global level. Trade policy instruments, such 
as tariffs and quotas, have direct and indirect effects on the relative prices of commodities 
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produced in a given country. As the mix of goods and services produced changes, the demand for 
factors of production also changes. Consequently, it is difficult to conceive a situation in any 
economy where the change in trade policy affects only one sector. Due to the forward and 
backward linkages and their related strengths existing in a particular economy, the result is 
always one in which the relative mix of sectoral outputs change. This, by extension, affects the 
relative mix of the different factors of production in the different sectors.  
 
The country-level effects on output mix and demands for factors of production can in the context 
of international trade be extended to the global economy. Changes in relative prices of outputs 
and inputs resulting in a given country’s change in trade policy are transmitted to the industries 
and input markets of other economies that the country trades with. Therefore, for trade policy 
analysis to be meaningful and for robust results to be produced, the interactions that prevail 
among different sectors as a result of a change in a given group of countries trade policy 
instruments must be taken into account. The general equilibrium methodology provides an 
analytical framework that allows for inter- and intra-sectoral changes in output mix, and by 
extension the demand for different factors of production to be captured.  
 
Kehoe T. and Kehoe P. (1994) succinctly captured the essence of general equilibrium models. 
General equilibrium models are an abstraction that is complex enough to capture the essential 
features of the economy, yet simple enough to be tractable. These models are popular over their 
partial equilibrium counterparts because they stress the interactions among different sectors. 
However, they are not perfect, especially the static ones, since they fail to take into account the 
dynamic effects that accompany changes taking place in a given economy as a result of policy 
change. The GTAP model falls in this class of general equilibrium models. GTAP is a multi-
region computable general equilibrium (CGE) model designed for comparative-static analysis of 
trade policy issues (Adams et al. 1997).  It can be used to capture effects on output mix, factor 
usage, trade effects and resultant welfare distribution between countries as a result of changing 
trade policies at the country, bilateral, regional and multilateral levels. Since the GTAP model 
puts emphasis on resource reallocation across economic sectors, it is a good instrument for 
identifying the winning and losing countries and sectors under policy changes involving the trade 
aspects of FTAs. 
 
 
3.2. The GTAP Database and the Study Aggregation 
3.2.1. Data description 
The GTAP model is used together with the GTAP database which, like the model, captures 
individual and composites of countries. In this exposition, Version 6 of the database is used. The 
base year for this version is 2001 and recognizes 87 regions as well as 57 sectors and 5 factors of 
production. Thus, for each individual or composite region, there are 57 sectors whose data is 
captured in the overall GTAP database. As previously indicated, not all countries are individually 
captured in GTAP. However, each economy is indirectly included in the database as part of a 
given composite region or as part of the rest of the world. Thus, global macroeconomic 
consistency holds. For the purpose of our study, Morocco and the US are presented separately.  
 
Bilateral trade data is a critical component of the GTAP database. It is these bilateral trade flows 
that transmit policy and growth shocks between countries. Indeed, trade shares are important in 
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explaining the simulation results. Bilateral trade is also important when looking at the terms of 
trade implications. The global bilateral data is sourced from the United Nations COMTRADE 
data. This is supplemented with individual countries global trade information and trade totals or 
aggregate bilateral trade statistics such as those available from the IMF, FAO and World Bank. 
 
Another important sub-component of the GTAP database is data protection. Data is both explicit 
and implicit. It is explicit in the sense that tariff or export revenue and anti-dumping data by 
commodity and region are available.. It is implicit in the sense that bilateral trade data is available 
both in market and world prices. The key sources of the protection data vary. Agricultural tariffs 
are obtained from the Economic Research Service, the EU and the applied or Most-Favoured 
Nation (MFN) rates. Merchandise tariffs, on the other hand, are available from the World 
Integrated Trade Solution project of the World Bank and UNCTAD (details of WITS are 
presented in the section discussing the SMART methodology). Domestic support protection data 
is obtained from the OECD’s producer subsidy equivalent tables and can be divided into output 
subsidies, input subsidies, land-based and capital-based payments. 
 
3.2.2. Sectoral and geographical aggregations 
 
For the present study, 87 regions have been aggregated into 5 subregions, and 57 sectors have 
been identified. A complete description of the sectoral and geographical aggregation is posted in 
Annex 1. 
 
3.2.3. Scenarios tested in the CGE modelling 
 
In order to assess the overall effect of the FTA on the Moroccan economy, we test three 
scenarios: 
• Scenario 1: Strongly asymmetrical liberalization. All tariffs and quotas are removed by 
the US on imports from Morocco (duty free, quota free entrance for Moroccan exports), 
while Morocco reduces its tariffs on imports from the US by 10% (which roughly 
corresponds to a one-year liberalization impact for Morocco in the actual agreement);  
• Scenario 2: Intermediate asymmetrical liberalization. All tariffs are removed by the US 
on imports from Morocco, while Morocco reduces tariffs on imports from the US by 
50%; and 
• Scenario 3: Full reciprocity, full liberalization. All bilateral tariffs are removed between 
Morocco and the US. All ad valorem tariffs, which appear in Figure 1, are reduced to 
zero.  
 
These 3 scenarios are compatible with the main objectives of the Doha agenda related to market 
access and the reductions of all forms of export subsidies and trade-distorting domestic support. 
 
None of the three scenarios correspond to the actual agreement, although they give some 
indication of the relative importance of having an asymmetric agreement. Indeed, the U.S.-
Morocco FTA eliminates tariffs on 95% of bilateral trade in consumer and industrial products 
(including textiles) with all remaining tariffs to be eliminated within 9 years. Particular treatment 
is reserved for agricultural products. Some important Moroccan exports, such as clementines, 
tomatoes and olives, will be allowed to enter the US duty-free market on the first day of 
implementation. Morocco will in turn provide immediate duty-free access to American products 
such as pistachios, pecans, nuts, almonds, processed poultry product (with some restriction), 
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pizza cheese and other foodstuff. For all other agricultural products, tariffs will be phased out in 5 
to 15 years. 
 
The agreement includes broad commitments in some key services, namely banking and insurance 
(with a 4-year protection period), distribution, express delivery, engineering, audiovisual and 
telecommunications.  
 
An important characteristic of the agreement is that it includes asymmetrical commitments to 
Morocco’s advantage, as suggested by Scenarios 1 and 2. This asymmetry is justified by the 
difference in the level of development of the trading partners and by the difference in the average 
level of the tariff schedules of the 2 countries, which amounts to more than 20% for Morocco 
against 4% for the US (Figure 3). 
Figure 3. Ad valorem tariffs on different commodities (bilateral trade) 
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4. The Free trade Agreement between Morocco and the US: The Partial Equilibrium 
Modelling Framework – the WITS/SMART Model 
 
4.1. Rationale for a Partial Equilibrium Model 
 
It was argued that trade policy analysis is more robust when undertaken within a general 
equilibrium modelling framework. This can be seen as the best option as general equilibrium 
models not only measure the first-round effects of simulated change, but also the second-round 
effects which include inter-industry effects and macroeconomic adjustments. However, as was 
indicated in the discussions on the GTAP modelling and database frameworks, GTAP does not 
provide any information at the tariff lines levels. This data could give us important information 
concerning the economic impact of the FTA between Morocco and the US. This section therefore 
describes the partial equilibrium modelling methodology that was used in the study to 
complement the GTAP results. The main distinction that should be noted at the outset is that as a 
partial equilibrium model, the inter-sectoral implications (second-round effects) of trade policy 
change are not taken into account as is the case in the general equilibrium model. Similarly, the 
inter-regional implications, such as within a regional economic communities (REC) setting, are 
also ignored in a partial equilibrium framework. The only point of convergence between the 
partial and general equilibrium models is that it is still possible within a partial equilibrium model 
to analyze the trade policy effects on trade creation and diversion, welfare and tariff revenues 
while holding everything else constant. 
 
Milner et al. (2002) provide a simple analytical framework explaining the theory behind partial 
equilibrium modelling and note that to adequately capture the interactions between sectors and 
elasticities of substitution between factors, and to simulate dynamic effects in their EPA study 
between the EU and the East African Community, a general equilibrium model would be 
desirable. However, partial equilibrium models would work as an alternative due to scarcity of 
individual and regional CGE models for developing countries. Milner et al. (2002) also observed 
that the database for general equilibrium models lacks the details on commodities needed to take 
into account specific sensitive and special products that are of interest to both the Sub-Saharan 
African countries and the EU. A partial equilibrium framework is in a better position, in spite of 
its shortcomings, to allow for the utilization of the now widely available trade data at the 
appropriate level of detail that would allow for the principle of special and differential treatment 
to be captured in the simulation analysis. It however remains true that although partial 
equilibrium models have drawbacks, as a modelling approach they have the advantage of 
working at very fine levels of detail such as the tariff line level.  
 
4.2. The WITS/SMART Model 
 
For the purposes of this study, it is proposed that the WITS/SMART model will be the applied 
partial equilibrium framework. WITS brings together various databases ranging from bilateral 
trade, commodity trade flows and various levels and types of protection. WITS also integrates 
analytical tools that support simulation analysis. The SMART simulation model is one of the 
analytical tools in WITS used for simulation purposes. SMART contains in-built analytical 
modules that support trade policy analysis, covering the effects of multilateral tariff cuts, 
preferential trade liberalization and ad hoc tariff changes. The underlying theory behind this 
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analytical tool is the standard partial equilibrium framework that considers dynamic effects to be 
constant. Like any partial equilibrium model, these strong assumptions only allow trade policy 
analysis to be undertaken one country at a time. In spite of this weakness, WITS/SMART can 
help estimate trade creation, diversion, welfare and revenue effects. 
 
Trade creation 
 
The underlying theory is summarised below for the estimation of the trade flows and revenue 
effects. The exposition of the WITS/SMART theory is summarised from Laird and Yeats (1986). 
Trade creation captures the trade expanding aspects of liberalisation that leads to the 
displacement of inefficient producers in a given preferential trading area (a free trade area for 
instance). It is assumed that there is full transmission of price changes when tariff or non-tariff 
distortions (ad valorem equivalents) are reduced or eliminated. Laird and Yeats (1986) derive 
clearly the equation that can be used to estimate the trade creation effects. The derivation begins 
with the following basic trade model composed of simplified import demand and export supply 
functions and an equilibrating identity: 
 
A simplified import demand function for country j from country k of commodity i: 
),,( ikijjijk PPYfM =        (1) 
 
The export supply function of commodity i of country k can be simplified as: 
)( ikjijk PfX =         (2) 
 
The equilibrium in the trade between the two countries is the standard partial equilibrium 
equation: 
ikjijk XM =         (3) 
 
In a free trade environment, the domestic price2 of commodity i in country j from country k 
would change with the change in an ad valorem tariff as follows: 
)1( ijkikjijk tPP +=        (4) 
 
To derive the trade creation formula, following Laird and Yeats (1986), the price equation (4) is 
totally differentiated to get: 
ikjijkijkikjijk dPtdtPdP )1( ++=       (5) 
Equations (4) and (5) are then substituted into the elasticity of import demand equation3 to get: 
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ ++= ikj
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ijk
ijkm
i
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P
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t
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M
dM
)1(
η      (6) 
 
                                                 
2 The transport and insurance costs are not reflected in the equation explicitly.  
3 The elasticity of import demand is 
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i
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P
P
M
M ∆=∆ η  
9 
From the identity in equation (3), 
ikj
ikj
ijk
ijk
X
dX
M
dM =  can be used to derive the following expression 
for elasticity of export supply: 
ijk
ijk
e
iikj
ikj
M
dM
P
dP
γ
1=  
which when used in equation 6, allows the computation of the trade creation effect. From 
equation (3) the trade creation effect is equivalent to exporting country k’s growth of exports of 
commodity i to country j: 
))/1)(1(( ei
m
iijk
ijkm
iijkijk t
dt
MTC γηη −+=     (7) 
 
If , then equation (7) can be simplified as follows: ∞→eiγ
)1(
)1()1(
0
01
ijk
ijkijk
ijk
m
iijk t
tt
MTC +
+−+= η      (8) 
 
where TCijk is the sum of trade created in millions of dollars over i commodities affected by tariff 
change and is the elasticity of import demand for commodity i in the importing country from 
the relevant trading partner. M
m
iη
ijk is the current level of import demand of the given commodity i. 
and represent tariff rates for commodity i at the initial and end periods respectively. Trade 
creation then depends on the current level of imports, the import demand elasticity and the 
relative tariff change. 
0
ijkt
1
ijkt
 
Trade diversion 
 
Trade diversion as opposed to trade creation can expand or contract trade globally. Trade 
diversion is the phenomenon that occurs in a free trade area for example whereby efficient 
producers from outside the free trade area are displaced by less efficient producers in the 
preferential area. Consider an EPA between ECOWAS and EU for instance. Trade diversion 
would result if as a result of the establishment of the EPA more efficient suppliers from the rest 
of the world (ROW) into ECOWAS are displaced by inefficient producers from the EU. 
Assuming that such an EPA is formed which leads to reduction of tariffs facing the EU without 
any changes in the tariffs facing the ROW exporters; the theory underlying the measurement of 
trade diversion in SMART is also explained in Laird and Yeats (1986). To see the derivation 
clearly, first the expression for elasticity of substitution is given. The elasticity of substitution can 
be expressed as the percentage change in relative shares of imports from two different sources 
due to a one per cent change in the relative prices of the same product from these two sources: 
 
( ) ( )ijKijkijKijk k K
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K
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M PPPP
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⎛∆
=
∑ ∑∑∑
σ    (9) 
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where k denotes imports from EU and K denotes imports from the rest of the World. Equation (9) 
can be expanded, and through substitutions and rearrangements be used to obtain the expression 
for trade diversion, which is expressed as: 
 
∑ ∑∑
∑ ∑
∑ ∆++
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k ijKijk
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Equation (10) can be simplified to the case of an EPA. The relative price movement terms in the 
equation as noted in Laird and Yeats (1986) capture the movement due to changes in tariffs or the 
ad valorem incidence of non-tariff distortions for the EU and the ROW. Therefore, the trade 
diverted to the EU in the EPA,  can be captured by reducing equation (10) above as 
follows: 
EPATD
 
M
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   (11) 
 
Equation (11) shows the additional EU imports into the African EPA configured region such as 
ECOWAS over and above the increase in ECOWAS imports as a result of trade creation. There 
isn’t necessarily a net increase in imports into ECOWAS as this involves the displacement of 
ROW imports into ECOWAS. EUM  and ROWM  are the current imports into the African REC 
configuration for EPA purposes from the EU and ROW respectively. and are respectively 
the end and initial periods import tariffs imposed on EU imports in the destination REC with 
. 
1
EUt
0
EUt
01
EUEU tt < Mσ is the elasticity of substitution between EU and ROW imports into the concerned 
country or REC. Trade diversion then depends on the current level of imports from the EU and 
ROW, the percentage change (reduction in this case) of tariffs facing EU imports with those for 
ROW remaining unchanged and the elasticity of substitution of the imports from the two sources. 
The higher the value of the elasticity of substitution, the greater will be the trade diversion 
effects. 
 
Trade expansion 
 
Adding the trade creation and diversion derives the total effect on trade. As indicated in Laird and 
Yeats (1986), the summation in equations (8) and (10) for an importing country can be done 
across products and/or across sources. It is also possible to sum the results across a group of 
importers for single or groups of products as well as for single sources of supply or groups of 
suppliers. 
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The revenue effect 
 
The quantification of the revenue effect using WITS/SMART model is simple. In theory, the 
tariff revenue is given as the product of the tax rate (tariff rate in this case) and the tax base (the 
value of imports). Thus, before the change in the ad valorem incidence of the trade barriers, the 
revenue is given as: 
 
∑∑=
i k
ijkijkijk MPtR
0
0  
 
After the change in the tariff rate, the new revenue collection will be given by: 
∑∑=
i k
ijkijkijk MPtR
1
1  
 
The revenue loss as a result of the implementation of an EPA would then be the net effect 
between R1 and R0 which is the same as: 
 
∑∑∆=
i k
ijkijkijk MPtRL       (12) 
 
The welfare effect 
 
The WITS/SMART model estimation of welfare effects is quite simple. This is unlike the 
equivalent variations measurement in general equilibrium models. Essentially, the welfare effect 
is mainly ascribed to the consumer benefits in the importing country as a result of lower import 
prices4. This allows them to substitute more expensive domestic or imported products with the 
cheaper imports that are affected by the relevant tariff reduction. Increased imports leads to a net 
welfare gain that can be thought as the increase in consumer welfare and is measured as follows: 
 
)(5.0 ijkijkijk Mtw ∆∆=        (13) 
 
The coefficient of 0.5 captures the average between the ad valorem incidence of the trade barriers 
before and after their elimination/reduction. Equation (13) assumes that the elasticity of export 
supply is infinite. If this is not the case, the import prices in the importing countries fall by less 
than the full reduction in trade barriers. Therefore, while the equation can be used to measure 
welfare effect, it is no longer a representation of consumer surplus alone but has some element of 
producer surplus (see Laird and Yeats, 1986). 
 
The database 
 
WITS database comes from various sources. The external trade statistics comprise of UN 
COMTRADE, UNCTAD TRAINS and the WTO Integrated Data Base (IDB). The tariffs data is 
derived from UNCTAD TRAINS, WTO IDB and WTO Consolidated Tariff Schedule Data Base 
(CTS). The non-tariff measures are compiled from UNCTAD TRAINS database. 
                                                 
4 As emphasized in Laird and Yeats (1986), in the case of pre-existing level of imports, there is no net welfare gain 
in the country as the tariff reduction simply means a reallocation/transfer of revenue from the government to the 
consumers. 
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4.3. Simulation scenarios 
 
Unlike the general equilibrium analysis where it is possible to look at several scenarios, only one 
simulation was undertaken for this FTA with the partial model. This scenario looks only at the 
reciprocity principal. Due to the weaknesses already pointed out, especially the ceteris paribus 
assumption upon which this model operates, only one-way liberalization is possible. The results 
discussed here are the possible outcomes of reducing to zero the import duties that Morocco 
imposes on US goods. One special advantage of the WITS/SMART model is that it allowed the 
analysis to be undertaken at the 6-digit level. There was therefore no aggregation problem such as 
the one with the GTAP database. Trade created from the full reciprocity scenario depends on the 
following three key elements as discussed in the analytical methodology: the initial level of trade 
(imports from the US); the initial level of protection; and the price elasticity of import demand. 
The higher the initial level of protection, the greater the change expected from the reciprocation 
policy will be. The transmission mechanism for the trade effects is simple: the elimination of 
existing tariffs on US imports reduces the prices that consumers in the importing African country 
face compared to domestic substitutes, while the responsiveness of demand to the price change 
influences the amount of trade created or diverted. The substitutability of US goods for domestic 
goods is implicitly assumed. The Armington assumption at HS 6-digit level is that goods 
imported from different countries are imperfect substitutes. It is also assumed that the supply 
response to the price reduction will allow US producers and exporters to meet any demand 
arising in the importing countries as a result of price reduction. That is, export supplies are 
perfectly elastic, meaning that world supplies of each variety of the goods by origin are given. 
 
5. Simulation results  
 
This section discusses in detail the results obtained from the empirical analysis. The GTAP 
model analysis is complemented in the study with the SMART partial equilibrium analysis 
model.   
 
5.1. General Equilibrium Results 
 
Using the GTAP simulation model, we propose a quantitative assessment of the potential impacts 
of the 3 possible implementations of free trade described above on the economic growth of the 
two countries, on welfare, on sectoral value added, on exports, imports, trade balance and terms 
of trade. These results will give some tangible elements the necessity of an asymmetric 
agreement. 
 
5.1.1. Impacts on welfare and growth 
 
As shown in Table 2 and Figures 4 and 5, the additional growth provided by trade liberalization 
is modest in the 2 countries, but not inconsiderable in Morocco (the rate of growth of Moroccan 
GDP would be increased by an additional 0.37% and a net welfare gain equal to US$37 million 
in the first scenario (strongly asymmetrical liberalization)).  
The difference in the impact on the US and Moroccan GDP and welfare are clearly related to the 
difference in the size of the 2 countries and in the importance of their bilateral trade relations.  
 
In any scenario, the impact of trade liberalization on the rate of growth would be much more 
important for Morocco than for the US, taking into account the difference in the bilateral trade 
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flows sizes: US imports from Morocco represent 0.03% of total US imports, while Moroccan 
imports from the US correspond to 3.4% of total Moroccan imports.    
 
Welfare effects, on the other hand, are much greater in the US. The impact on total welfare 
resulting from a one-dollar reduction in the price of an imported good is greater for a country 
with a population of 300 million than for a country with 30.6 million people. Lastly and more 
importantly, these results prove the importance of an asymmetrical and gradual liberalization 
process for Morocco. As the liberalization scenario become more liberal, the changes in GDP and 
welfare are lowered for Morocco. Finally, the Moroccan gains associated with Scenarios 1 and 2 
result in recession and impoverishment in Scenario 3 (see table 2 and figures 4 and 5). 
 
Table 2. Impacts of the three different scenarios on welfare (in millions of US dollars) and GDP growth rate (in %) 
Scenarios Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 
Regions Welfare GDP Welfare GDP Welfare GDP 
Morocco 37.08 0.37 26.49 0.18 -112.1 -0.78 
USA 962.02 0.03 1001.65 0.03 1115.94 0.04 
RofNAFR -38.19 0.09 -39.55 0.09 -43.37 0.08 
ROW -1277.54 0.06 -1303.83 0.05 -1375.13 0.05 
Source: Authors’ GTAP simulation 
 
Figure 4. Impacts on welfare  (in millions of US dollars) 
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Source: Authors’ GTAP simulation 
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Figure 5. Impacts on the rate of growth of the GDP (in %) 
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Source: Authors’ GTAP simulation 
 
 
5.1.2. Impacts on sectoral value added  
 
If we consider the impact on the output, and more precisely on the variation of the value added in 
the 2 countries, we can conclude that the FTA creates both winners and losers in the 2 countries.  
 
In Morocco, meat, electronic equipment, leather, textiles and clothing benefit as the trade 
scenario becomes more liberal. Textile and clothing apparel appear to be (and will probably be) 
among the biggest winners. This activity can be expected to take advantage of increasing 
production in a short period of time as a result of immediate liberalization. On the other hand, 
transport equipment, metals, mineral products and wheat lose out in the same process. Our 
simulation is therefore consistent with the fact that wheat is a highly political issue in Morocco. 
Eight million people in Morocco depend on wheat production, which is the main crop produced 
by small farmers. A full immediate liberalization in this sector would cause a large percentage of 
the Moroccan rural population to lose their livelihood. Not surprisingly, wheat is the only US 
product to remain subject to a quota in the actual agreement.  
 
US farmers are expected to be the biggest beneficiaries of the agreement with Morocco, namely 
for wheat production, beef and animal feed, particularly for poultry which corresponds to the 
most important feed grain demand and the fastest growing meat production in Morocco. 
However, American oil seeds producers would experience severe losses in every scenario 
(Table 3). 
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Table 3. Impacts of the three scenarios of trade liberalization on selected industrial and agricultural activities (% of 
variation of value added) 
 Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 
Sectors Morocco USA Morocco USA Morocco USA 
Meat products nec -1.74 0.12 0.28 0.11 6.33 0.11 
Meat: cattle,sheep,goats,horse -1.57 0.1 -0.28 0.09 4.13 0.07 
Electronic equipment -1.34 0.08 -0.76 0.07 1.57 0.04 
Transport equipment nec -1.21 0.06 -3.84 0.06 -8.07 0.06 
Metals nec -1.07 0.07 -0.65 0.04 -2.02 0.07 
Machinery and equipment nec -0,86 0,05 -0,74 0,05 1,08 0,04 
Animal products -0.81 1.00 -0.44 0.97 -0.2 0.16 
Ferrous metals -0.8 0.04 -0.65 0.06 0.14 0.04 
Vegetables, fruit, nuts -0.17 -0.75 1.57 -1.26 0.26 -0.85 
Mineral products nec -0.14 0.03 -0.66 0.04 -2.02 0.07 
Leather products -0.14 0.18 -0.08 0.17 0.45 0.18 
Wheat 0.33 2.28 -0.87 2.68 -4.42 3.88 
Textiles 0.88 0.11 1.84 0.13 5.26 0.2 
Vegetable oils and fats 1.11 -1.25 1.57 -1.26 2.73 -1.27 
Wearing apparel 2.82 0.03 3.64 0.04 6.42 0.09 
Oil seeds 3.06 -10.65 2.52 -10.67 1.87 -10.76 
Source: Authors’ GTAP simulation 
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5.1.3. Impacts on sectoral exports, imports and trade balance  
 
The general picture is roughly the same when we consider the potential effects on trade. In 
Morocco, under full liberalization, the trade balance would improve particularly for clothing, 
sugar, vegetables and leather products, while it would deteriorate notably for wheat. 
 
In the US, the FTA would cause the greatest improvement for chemical, rubber and plastic 
products and textiles, while trade deterioration would be felt most in oil seed and vegetables 
(Table 4). Part of these changes is related to the evolution of the terms of trade, which would 
deteriorate significantly for Morocco should the liberalization process be complete, immediate 
and perfectly reciprocal as described by the third scenario (Figure 6)  
 
 
Table 4. Changes in trade balance for selected products (in millions of US dollars) 
 
 Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 
Sectors Morocco USA Morocco USA Morocco USA 
Wearing apparel 89.13 -8.81 108.86 -3.23 166.24 39.38
Sugar 2.78 5.51 3.31 5.39 5.18 5.04
Vegetables, fruit, nuts -1.85 -146.63 0.7 -147.43 4.9 -167.79
Leather products -0.6 6.07 -0.13 5.29 3.5 4.58
Vegetable oils and fats 0.08 -146.65 -0.6 -152.03 3.12 -149.66
Crops nec -0.04 -124.14 0.32 -134.27 2.49 -164.27
Plant-based fibers 1.04 25.4 1.3 23.81 2.32 19.16
Raw milk 1.33 -0.25 1.37 -0.28 1.51 -0.37
Fishing -0.17 0.79 -0.12 0.78 0.27 0.76
Oil seeds 1.01 -789.22 0.25 -790.89 -0.58 -798.01
Meat products nec -0.1 68.87 -0.08 67.05 -1.8 66.48
Cereal grains nec -1.13 33.17 -4.74 38.55 -9.84 44.69
Chemical,rubber,plastic prods -12.43 194.04 -13.33 195.33 -12.76 193.7
Machinery and equipment nec -12.42 239.91 -15.3 226.23 -15.61 164
Dairy products -1.36 -28.72 -1.54 -26.51 -17.36 4.72
Paper products, publishing -1.91 30.86 -6.08 38.29 -18.57 56.17
Mineral products nec -3.58 20.45 -12.69 32.59 -41.19 65.01
Textiles -24.3 81.72 -29.96 99.31 -58.94 161.81
Wheat -0.04 186.17 -19.43 215.63 -90.77 305
Source: Authors’ GTAP simulation 
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Figure 6. Terms of Trade (%) 
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Source: Authors’ GTAP simulation 
 
 
5.2. Potential Economic and Welfare Impacts of FTA on Morocco: Partial Equilibrium 
Results 
 
In this section, the results using the WITS/SMART partial equilibrium model showing the 
possible impact of the FTA on Morocco are discussed, under the assumption of a full reciprocity, 
full liberalization scenario. Essentially, we want to analyze the possible consequences of a 
complete elimination of tariff barriers on the Moroccan economy, and more precisely the impacts 
on welfare, tariff revenues and exports. We choose to simulate the impact of a complete 
dismantlement of tariffs in order to clearly expose the effects of trade liberalization on all 
Moroccan products. This is therefore an “extreme scenario” which aims at delineating the general 
trends of the impact of liberalization of the Maroccan economy under the FTA.   
The results on trade creation and diversion are also reported. 
 
5.2.1. Impact on consumer’s welfare 
 
The concepts of producer and consumer surplus help economists to make welfare (normative) 
judgments about different ways of producing and distributing goods. In our CGE analysis, we 
analyzed global welfare as a whole. However, WITS only gives us the possibility to approximate 
the consumer surplus.  
 
Table 5 displays the Harmonized system chapters (HS02) yielding the highest welfare gains for 
Morocco. Together, these 6 product groups account for more than 65% of total welfare gains in 
the country in the case of liberalization of trade with the US.  By far, the group of products 
yielding the highest welfare gains are cereals (32.4%), followed by electrical equipment and 
plastic industries (20%).  
 
Our simulations show that if we take into consideration only the effect on consumer welfare, as 
opposed to Table 2 which assesses the welfare implications for the whole of each economy, 
Moroccan consumers benefit greatly. They will be able to purchase US consumer goods (part of 
the immediate liberalization) at cheaper prices, obtaining thus an immediate – but limited - 
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improvement in their standard of living. Indeed, in a full liberalization scenario, the total 
improvement in Moroccan consumer welfare would equal US$24.9 million per year (Table 4). 
 
Moroccan consumers will derive gains from the FTA since they will have access to goods at 
lower prices. To this point, it is assumed that US producers and exporters will not be pricing to 
market. In other words, there is an implicit assumption that US exporters and Moroccan 
importers will pass the benefits of tariff reductions on to Moroccan consumers. If the benefits of 
tariff dismantlement are not passed on to Moroccan consumers but are captured by the exporter 
or the importer, it is possible that there will be no increase in consumer welfare.  
 
It is therefore crucial to ensure that welfare is transmitted to consumers. To this end, it is 
necessary that the competition policy shield consumers against possible abuse of potential 
dominant positions or against collusion from large importers. Competition policy capacities and 
the judicial system supporting it should therefore be strengthened to ensure that the FTA delivers 
its potential benefits. 
 
However, it should be noted that the overall economic welfare effects are not clear within a 
partial equilibrium modelling framework since producer surplus changes, especially since the 
supplanting of domestic producers by EU producers has not been captured in this analysis. In our 
CGE analysis, we have shown that total welfare will decrease to US$112 US million. This result 
clearly indicates that Moroccan producer surplus will suffer from a full liberalization scenario. 
These results could have significant implications on the structure of production in Morocco. 
Therefore, the results dictate clearly in favour of a progressive dismantelment in order to limit the 
adjustment costs. 
 
While recognizing the weakness of consumer surplus as a proxy for welfare implications of the 
FTA, the partial equilibrium results tell only part of the story. Indeed, increased imports through 
trade creation do not only benefit consumers in Morocco. Potential gains are also likely to 
emanate from embodied technologies in some imports that may eventually be welfare enhancing. 
This will however depend on capital equipment and machinery and such imports that tend to 
have embodied technologies  
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Table 5. Impact of full liberalization on consumer welfare in Morocco by commodity  
(in millions of US dollars) 
Sectors Welfare Changes % Cumulative 
Cereals 8.07 32.4% 32.0% 
Electrical mchy equip parts thereof;  sound recorder etc 3.20 12.8% 44.8% 
Plastics and articles thereof 1.79 7.2% 52.0% 
Paper & paperboard; art of paper pulp,  paper/paperboard 1.61 6.5% 58.5% 
Rubber and articles thereof 1.16 4.6% 63.1% 
Mineral fuels, oils & product of their  distillation; etc 1.13 4.5% 67.6% 
Vehicles o/t railw/tramw roll-stock, pts  & accessories 0.85 3.4% 71.0% 
Tobacco and manufactured tobacco substitutes 0.79 3.2% 74.2% 
Aircraft, spacecraft, and parts thereof 0.75 3.0% 77.2% 
Nuclear reactors, boilers, mchy & mech  appliance; parts 0.66 2.7% 79.9% 
Iron and steel 0.46 1.8% 81.7% 
Cotton 0.40 1.6% 83.3% 
Man-made staple fibres 0.36 1.4% 84.8% 
Miscellaneous chemical products 0.33 1.3% 86.1% 
Articles of iron or steel 0.32 1.3% 87.4% 
Pharmaceutical products 0.24 1.0% 88.3% 
Others 2.8  11.7% 100.00% 
Total 24.9 100.0%   
Source: Authors’ WTIS simulation  
 
5.2.2. Impact on Moroccan tariffs revenues 
 
As would be expected, the elimination of import tariffs from the US is shown to harm 
government revenues in Morocco. In a full liberalization scenario, the FTA would significantly 
reduce Moroccan tariff revenues by more than US$147 million. Almost 60% of these losses 
would result from the elimination of duties on the import of US cereals (Table 6). This represents 
0.5% of GDP and 4.5% of the balance of payments. One may mention that cereals account for 
almost 60% of the revenue shortfall. We can therefore understand why this product was treated 
separately during the negotiations. 
 
In some cases, the bulk of the loss of revenues comes from the elimination of tariffs on goods 
that could otherwise be easily taxed (excise duty for example).  Nevertheless, in terms of 
evaluating the FTA for Morocco, it can be noted that the foregone revenue is likely to have 
negative impacts on other government programmes. When this is combined with undermining 
regional integration, one is left with a picture that goes beyond normal international trade theory 
arguments. The question about the significance of non-economic reasons for integration comes 
into play. It is therefore necessary to look closer at the real weight of such a revenue loss on 
government finance. If the FTA entails full liberalization of US imports, Morocco would have to 
forgoe tariff revenues amounting to almost 2.5% of their public revenue. 
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It is important to note however that the revenue loss indicated by our simulations relates to 
imports tariff revenues. In reality, the increased imports presented earlier resulting from trade 
creation are in most countries subject to indirect taxes such as the VAT. As such, as long as there 
is rapid increase in the volume and value of imports into Morocco, and this country has indirect 
taxes such as VAT, then the revenue shortfall described will be minimized. However, unless the 
elasticity of the VAT and indirect taxes is significantly higher than that for import duties, it is 
unlikely that addition indirect tax revenues will outweigh the foregone revenue from the import 
tariffs.  
 
Table 6. Impact of full liberalization on tariff revenue losses in Morocco 
 (Millions of US dollars) 
 
Description Variation of tariff revenues % 
Cereals -85.93 58.4%
Electrical mchy equip parts thereof;  sound recorder etc -9.90 6.7%
Mineral fuels, oils & product of their  distillation; etc -7.19 4.9%
Paper & paperboard; art of paper pulp,  paper/paperboard -6.27 4.3%
Tobacco and manufactured tobacco substitutes -5.54 3.8%
Oil seed, oleagi fruits; miscell grain,  seed, fruit etc -5.147 3.5%
Nuclear reactors, boilers, mchy & mech  appliance; parts -3.43 2.3%
Aircraft, spacecraft, and parts thereof -2.45 1.7%
Vehicles o/t railw/tramw roll-stock, pts  & accessories -2.17 1.5%
Iron and steel -2.09 1.4%
Cotton -1.57 1.1%
Articles of iron or steel -1.54 1.0%
Man-made staple fibres -1.43 1.0%
Rubber and articles thereof -1.06 0.7%
Pharmaceutical products -0.97 0.7%
Others -10.50 7.0%
Total  -147.21 100%
Source: Authors’ WTIS simulation 
 
5.2.3. Impact on exports 
By providing duty free access to an American consumer market with 300 million individuals, the 
FTA will strongly stimulate Moroccan exports. Not surprisingly, this expansion would primarily 
concern the textile and clothing industry, which is the most important industrial activity in 
Morocco (43% of the country’s industrial exports, providing 39.5% of total industrial 
employment). Table 7 shows that the agreement will likely have strong effects concentrated only 
on a limited number of sectors. Simultaneously, US exports to Morocco would increase at a still 
higher percentage: 36,28% against 22,58% (Table 7). 
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Table 7. Total impact of full liberalization on Morocco’s exports to the US in selected products (in 
thousands of US dollars and as a % of the sectoral Moroccan exports to the US) 
 
Products Before After Change In Revenue % of increase 
Art of apparel & clothing access, not knitted/crocheted 48.83 71.48 22649.412 4 .4% 6 
Art of apparel & clothing access, knitted or crocheted 28.27 45.87 17603.708 62.3% 
Mineral fuels, oils & product of their distillation; etc 131.15 139.65 8497.814 6.5% 
Footwear, gaiters and the like; parts of such articles 4.54 6.47 1934.601 42.6% 
Prep of meat, fish or crustaceans, molluscs etc 10.48 12.08 1608.979 15.4% 
Edible vegetables and certain roots and tubers 6.00 6.57 566.686 9.4% 
 Total  237.77 291.45 53.68 22.58% 
Source: Authors’ WTIS simulation 
 
 
Table 8. Total impact of full liberalization on US exports to Morocco 
(Millions of US dollars) 
 
Before After Change In Revenue % of increase 
567.57 773.51 205.936 36.28% 
Source: Authors’ WTIS simulation 
 
 
5.2.4. Impact on third countries 
This section looks at possible impact of trade diversions on Morocco resulting from the FTA. It 
starts with a presentation of the losses in intra-regional trade, due to the substitution of intra-
regional exports by US products. Then, it will attempt to identify which products could be most 
affected by losses of intra-regional trade and would suffer the most from US competition.  
 
Trade diversion is the quantity of exports (of third countries) that is being replaced by US 
products after liberalization. We assume here that the effect of the elimination of the tariff is fully 
transmited to consumer prices.   
 
Indeed, the FTA between the US and Morocco will have significant impact not only on trade 
between these 2 countries, but also on the trading relationship with other countries. The most 
important trade diversion will affect the EU and particularly France, which is Morocco’s largest 
trading partner. It will also have adverse effects on the other North African countries (Table 9). 
The FTA will thus offer the opportunity to Morocco to diversify its markets and its capabilities 
which are currently strongly focused on the EU, particularly France and Spain. 
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Table 9. Impact of full liberalization on Moroccan trade with third countries 
(in millions of US dollars) 
 
Partner Total Trade Diversion 
USA + 92.60 
UMA -0.24 
Tunisia -0.20 
Algeria -0.03 
Libya -0.16 
Rest of Africa -3.63 
European Union -36.43 
France -17.23 
Spain -4.77 
Rest of the World -51.28 
Source: Authors’ WTIS simulation 
 
Our partial equilibrium simulations show that imports from the US to Morocco would increase by 
approximately US$53.68 million. Finally, our model shows results, albeit incomplete, concerning 
welfare gains. It seems that consumer surplus would mainly be improved through lowering the 
price of industrial goods such as cars, machinery and equipment. Furthermore, the FTA would 
significantly reduce Moroccan tariff revenues by more than US$147 million. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
Our analysis justifies the idea that a FTA between two zones at different levels of development 
needs to follow a progressive process of tariff dismantling for the most strategic sectors so as to 
limit the adjustment costs. It also argues in favour of an agreement which is not based on the 
principle of full reciprocity.  Under an immediate, full and reciprocal trade liberalization, 
Morocco would experience a decrease in its economic growth, a loss of economic welfare, a 
deterioration of its terms of trade and an important deterioration of its trade balance (Scenario 3) 
However, strongly asymmetrical and progressive liberalization (Scenario 1) would stimulate 
Moroccan economic growth, improve its welfare and its terms of trade and leave the trade 
balance almost unchanged.  Simultaneously, for the US, there is a relative indifference between 
the 3 scenarios as far as the impacts on welfare, the rate of growth and the evolution of the value 
added are concerned. Tables 2 and 3 show that the effects on the US are quite similar on these 
levels.  
 
When we consider the impact on the sectoral trade balance of the 3 scenarios (Table 4), the 
picture is more contrasted. For the US, a gradual and asymmetrical agreement would cause both 
improvements of the balance of trade in areas such as machinery and equipment, chemical, 
rubber, plastic products, wheat, and a deterioration in oil seeds, vegetables, fruits and nuts, oils 
and fats. However, according to our simulation, the global impact on the US balance of trade 
would be more advantageous with a gradual agreement (the total impact of Scenario 1 is a 
deterioration equal to US$77.65 million) than with the full liberalization scenario (which would 
cause a US$123.67 million deterioration). As a result, the move from a more liberal to a less 
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liberal scenario seems to be mutually advantageous for the two countries, as far as the trade 
balances are concerned..  
 
However, these figures must be considered cautiously. A more precise evaluation would require a 
dynamic simulation and a comparison of full liberalization with a scenario closer to the actual 
agreement, which is the objective of our oncoming research project. Beyond this strictly 
economic assessment, it is clear that the objectives of the FTA for the two trading partners are 
very different in a more general perspective: 
 
- For Morocco, engaging in free trade with the US aims at changing the country’s reliance on 
agriculture, which employs more than 40% of the labour force. Despite important investments in 
irrigation projects, this situation makes the country very vulnerable to weather hazards. As 
Minister of Trade and Industry Salaheddine Mezouar indicated,the government’s goal is to create 
500,000 jobs in industry over the next 10 years and increase the industrial gross domestic product 
to 23% of the total GDP by 2015 (as compared to 16% currently), and for industry to contribute 
1.6% of growth in GDP every year. In short, the main objective is to reduce the country’s 
dependence on agriculture, phosphate, and money sent home by its citizens living abroad, by 
developing industrial production and tourism. 
 
These objectives will require major economic and social changes and infrastructure investments 
(see for example the massive expansion in the northern city of Tangier which will multiply port 
traffic by 15 times, reduce transport costs to the US by 50% and bring Morocco to an average 6 
days sea distance from the US). 
 
- For the US, the main objective is not primarily economic, but rather geostrategic. Following the 
FTA with Jordan in 2000, the agreement with Morocco is a new step toward the creation of a 
large United States-Middle East free trade area, which is an important goal of the Bush 
administration, so as to integrate the Middle East into the modern global economy and create a 
friend and ally zone in an uncertain region. The next step will be Bahrain. National security 
considerations are probably the most important in this project, alongside the development of 
business transactions for US farmers and investors. The choice of Morocco is not random, but is 
the result of US political recognition of Morocco’s commitment to reform, modernization and 
openness.  
 
The differences identified in the objectives and the potential results of FTA are not necessarily an 
obstacle with the installation of a “win-win game”, because development and security issues 
work jointly in the fight against poverty. Contemporary economic history shows that it is 
irrelevant to look for earnings balanced in trade relations. The differences in the specialization 
and the vigour of both economies examined here explain the differences of impact on the scale 
and the dynamics of exports. For a young economy such as Morocco, the required profits are due 
first to the cumulative reinforcement of growth and income, but also with the modernization of 
the industrial system.  
 
It would be a huge error to believe that economic and social development can result automatically 
from the simple liberalization of trade, especially when the trading partner is a major world 
power such as the United States. After all, the success of the experiences of development does 
not only rely on a global integration strategy. They are also securely based on the forces and the 
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internal resources. No sustainable development is possible if it is not based on endogenous 
dynamics.  
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ANNEXES 
 
ANNEXE 1: Sectoral aggregation 
 
  New sector 
No. Code Description 
1 pdr Paddy rice 30lum Wood products 
2 wht Wheat 31ppp Paper products, publishing 
3 gro Cereal grains nec 32p_c Petroleum, coal products 
4 v_f Vegetables, fruit, nuts 33crp Chemical,rubber,plastic prods 
5 osd Oil seeds 34nmm Mineral products nec 
6 c_b Sugar cane, sugar beet 35i_s Ferrous metals 
7 pfb Plant-based fibers 36nfm Metals nec 
8 ocr Crops nec 37fmp Metal products 
9 ctl Cattle,sheep,goats,horses 38mvh Motor vehicles and parts 
10 oap Animal products nec 39otn Transport equipment nec 
11 rmk Raw milk 40ele Electronic equipment 
12 wol Wool, silk-worm cocoons 41ome Machinery and equipment nec 
13 frs Forestry 42omf Manufactures nec 
14 fsh Fishing 43ely Electricity 
15 coa Coal 44gdt Gas manufacture, distribution 
16 oil Oil 45wtr Water 
17 gas Gas 46cns Construction 
18 omn Minerals nec 47trd Trade 
19 cmt Meat: cattle,sheep,goats,horse 48otp Transport nec 
20 omt Meat products nec 49wtp Sea transport 
21 vol Vegetable oils and fats 50atp Air transport 
22 mil Dairy products 51cmn Communication 
23 pcr Processed rice 52ofi Financial services nec 
24 sgr Sugar 53isr Insurance 
25 ofd Food products nec 54obs Business services nec 
26 b_t Beverages and tobacco products 55ros Recreation and other services 
27 tex Textiles 56osg PubAdmin/Defence/Health/Educat 
28 wap Wearing apparel 57dwe Dwellings 
29 lea Leather products 
27 
ANNEXE 2: Geographical aggregation 
 
No. Code Aggregated région Comprising 
1 RofNAFR  Rest of North Africa Tunisia; Rest of North Africa. 
2 Morocco   Morocco. 
3 EU25   
Austria; Belgium; Denmark; Finland; France; Germany; 
United Kingdom; Greece; Ireland; Italy; Luxembourg; 
Netherlands; Portugal; Spain; Sweden; Cyprus; Czech 
Republic; Hungary; Malta; Poland; Slovakia; Slovenia; 
Estonia; Latvia; Lithuania. 
4 USA   United States. 
5 Turkey   Turkey. 
6 ROW   Australia; New Zealand; Rest of Oceania; China; Hong Kong; 
Japan; Korea; Taiwan; Rest of East Asia; Indonesia; Malaysia; 
Philippines; Singapore; Thailand; Vietnam; Rest of Southeast 
Asia; Bangladesh; India; Sri Lanka; Rest of South Asia; 
Canada; Mexico; Rest of North America; Colombia; Peru; 
Venezuela; Rest of Andean Pact; Argentina; Brazil; Chile; 
Uruguay; Rest of South America; Central America; Rest of 
FTAA; Rest of the Caribbean; Switzerland; Rest of EFTA; 
Rest of Europe; Albania; Bulgaria; Croatia; Romania; Russian 
Federation; Rest of Former Soviet Union; Rest of Middle East; 
Botswana; South Africa; Rest of South African CU; Malawi; 
Mozambique; Tanzania; Zambia; Zimbabwe; Rest of SADC; 
Madagascar; Uganda; Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa. 
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